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Abstract
The world’s two population giants (China and India) have under-
gone significant, and significantly different, demographic transitions
since the 1950s. The demographic dividends associated with these
transitions during the first three decades of this century are ex-
amined using a global economic model that incorporates full de-
mographic behavior and measures of dependency that reflect the
actual number of workers to non-workers, rather than the num-
ber of working-aged to non-working-aged. Although much of
China’s demographic dividend now lies in the past, alternative as-
sumptions about future trends in fertility and labor force partici-
pation rates are used to demonstrate that China will not neces-
sarily enter a period of “demographic taxation” for at least
another decade, if not longer. In contrast with China, much of
India’s potential demographic dividend lies in waiting for the de-
cades ahead, with the extent and duration depending critically on
a range of factors.
1. Introduction
There is a growing body of evidence to suggest that the
potential “dividend,” “gift,” or “bonus” associated with a
country’s demographic transition toward a population
dominated by people of working age can be quite substan-
tial (Bloom and Williamson 1998; Bloom, Canning, and
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Sevilla 2002). Perhaps no country has beneªted more from this transition than
China: according to some estimates, demographic change can explain up to a quar-
ter of China’s record-breaking pace of economic growth during the last two decades
of the 20th century (Cai and Wang 2005; Feng and Mason 2005). Yet, as noted by the
Asian Development Bank (ADB 2011, 38), “The demographic dividend is not, how-
ever, an automatic consequence of demographic changes. Rather, it depends on the
ability of the economy to productively use its additional workers—the ‘East Asian
Miracle’ is a case in point.” For India, with its slower and later demographic transi-
tion, much of the potential demographic dividend lies ahead, although whether it
can capture anything like the economic beneªts of China’s more dramatic post-
1970s demographic transition remains to be seen.
Most of the empirical research attempting to measure the effects of the demographic
transition on economic growth focuses on the declines in dependency ratios that fol-
low from falling fertility rates and the consequent rise in the ratio of the working-
aged to non-working-aged in a given population (Bloom and Williamson 1998; Bloom,
Canning, and Malaney 2000; Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla 2002; Bloom and Canning
2005a; Cai and Wang 2005; Bloom et al. 2007). Cai and Wang (2005) use this measure
to conclude that China’s demographic dividend will come to an end in 2015. As the
ADB (2011, 44) notes, however, “The value of an additional worker in the economy
varies by age, educational attainment, work experience, and the distribution of
workers across industries and occupations, among other things; it is also circum-
scribed by labor market and institutional parameters, such as labor force participa-
tion rates, unemployment rates, working hours, productivity, asset accumulation
(such as from pension funds), and labor laws.”
For this reason, the ADB use the slightly more reªned concept of an “economic sup-
port ratio,” which is the inverse of a dependency ratio that takes into account age-
speciªc labor incomes in a given base year to age-speciªc consumption expenditures
in the same year. Using this measure, they show that China’s economic support ra-
tio will peak in 2015 and India’s will peak in 2042. By taking into account the im-
pacts on labor force participation rates, capital accumulation, and total factor pro-
ductivity, the ADB projections reveal that China can expect to receive positive
growth beneªts from its changing demographic structure to 2020, with only a slight
“demographic tax” (a reduction of per capita GDP by only 0.8 percentage points) oc-
curring between 2020 and 2030. For India, signiªcant beneªts to growth are
expected for the period 2011–20 and 2021–30 (with the changing demographic
structure adding 1.1 and 0.85 percentage points to annual real per capita growth
rates, respectively).
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Our paper takes an alternative approach to projecting the paths of China’s and
India’s dependency rates and their growth consequences. We use a model of the
global economy that disaggregates regional households by age and sex and that in-
corporates full demographic behavior to project economic and demographic change
through to 2030. The results conªrm that India’s demographic change in the next
two decades could yield signiªcant (although not gigantic) potential gains to future
real per capita income, whereas for China these gains are largely in the past. The
more critical point, however, is that the timing and duration of the demographic
dividends in both countries is inºuenced by a number of factors, as we demonstrate
using alternative assumptions about future trajectories for fertility and labor force
participation rates in both countries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the various links between de-
mographic transition and economic growth in the context of China and India. In
Section 3, the composite model is described and the baseline scenario for the global
economy to 2030 is presented. Section 4 presents the results of simulations that
make reasonable alternative assumptions about fertility rates and labor force partici-
pation rates in each country. An alternative “constant population structure” scenario
is then introduced to isolate the demographic dividends to be enjoyed by the two
countries in the ªrst three decades of the 21st century. Section 5 offers conclusions.
2. Fertility decline and demographic transition
China’s exceptional economic growth and development during the last 50 years has
been accompanied by equally remarkable demographic change. Rapid drops in
mortality and fertility rates ushered in the most rapid “demographic transition” ex-
perienced at any time anywhere in world history. The demographic transition to
slower population growth has been profoundly affected by China’s family planning
policies, culminating in the one-child policy. Yet fertility rates would have declined
anyway, affected as they have been in China’s Asian neighbors by urbanization,
female education, increases in labor-force participation rates, improved life-
expectancy of newborn children, high parental costs of a competitive education sys-
tem, and myriad socioeconomic factors. Indeed, India’s fertility rates have also de-
clined steadily since the 1970s. The relatively slow speed of this decline has been
among the factors that have delayed India’s demographic transition, however, par-
ticularly when contrasted with China’s.
Figure 1 depicts the crude birth rates and death rates for China and India between
1950 and 2030 (actual data through to 2010 and projections thereafter). China’s
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transition began in the early 1950s, with the death rate falling dramatically from 25
(per 1,000) in 1950 to 11 in 1965.1 Infant mortality improved dramatically during this
time, although birth rates remained high until 1965,2 falling steadily thereafter from
37 (per 1,000) in 1965 to 22 in 1980, by which time the death rate had fallen to 7.3.
Since 1980, the birth rate continued to fall while the death rate changed only slightly,
ranging between 6.6 and 7.5 during the period 1980 to 2010. As the ªgure shows,
from nearly identical birth and death rates in 1950, China recorded a more rapid de-
cline in its death rate followed by a more rapid decline in its birth rate, resulting in a
more compressed and earlier transition than India.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the changing age structure of the Chinese and Indian pop-
ulations during the period 1950–2030, using United Nations (2010) data for the
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1 The use of ªve-yearly data smooths over the demographic disaster of Mao’s Great Leap For-
ward, which, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (2000), resulted in death rates
peaking at 25 in 1960. They recovered soon thereafter, however, and had fallen to 9.5 in 1965.
2 Infant mortality fell from 195 (per 1,000) births in 1950–55 to 121 in 1960–65 (United Nations
2010). As seen in the ªgure, the Great Leap Forward had a strong impact on birth rates as
well. According to the National Bureau of Statistics (2000), these fell to a low of 18 in 1961
and then peaked at 43 in 1963.
Figure 2. Youth and aged to working-aged population ratios, China and India, 1950–2030
Source: United Nations (2010).
Note: Population projections based on medium fertility variant. Youth dependency ratio is number of youth (0–14 years) divided by the
number of working-aged (15–59 years) in the total population. Aged dependency is number of aged (60+) divided by the number of
working-aged (15–59 years) in the total population.
youth (aged 0–14 years), working-aged (15–59 years), and aged (60 years) popula-
tions. There are numerous points of interest to our analysis here. First, the speed and
compression of China’s demographic transition relative to India’s is quite visible in
Figure 2, which shows the rapid decline in China’s youth dependency through to
2010 and the commencement of rapid aging since then. This combination implies
that China’s total dependency ratio (deªned here simply as the sum of youth and
aged dependency) declined through to 2010 and is increasing thereafter—or, equiva-
lently, that the proportion of its working-age population increased through to 2010
and is decreasing thereafter, as shown in Figure 3. In contrast, India’s demographic
transition is visibly much slower, with its total dependency ratio falling throughout
the period 1970–2030, and with the peak of India’s working-age to non-working-age
ratio in 2035 being 25 years behind China’s.
Although there are many factors that affect the timing and pace of each country’s
demographic transition, perhaps none do so more obviously than fertility. The early
recognition (by development economists such as Coale and Hoover 1958) that a re-
duction in fertility in low-income countries would produce important economic
beneªts fed into the idea of a “population problem” and the need for population
control as a means of promoting economic development in many developing coun-
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Figure 3. Working-aged to non-working-aged ratio, China and India, 1950–2030
Source: United Nations (2010).
Note: Population projections based on medium fertility variant. Ratio is the working-aged (15–59 or 15–64 years) population divided by
the non-working-aged (0–14 and 60+ /65+ years).
tries, including China, India, Pakistan, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, Sri Lanka,
Egypt, and Chile, all of which implemented a range of family planning policies from
the 1950s onward.
For China, this culminated in the controversial one-child policy, which according to
some estimates may have averted between 250 and 400 million births since its intro-
duction in the early 1980s.3 This large range of averted birth estimates in part
reºects ongoing controversies over just how far the fertility rate has fallen. Zhao
(2011) and Zhao and Chen (2011) do some careful analysis to show that China’s total
fertility rates (TFR) for the periods 1995–2000, 2000–05, and 2005–10 were 1.6, 1.45,
and 1.45, respectively. These ªgures contrast with those used in the UN’s (2010) pro-
jections of 1.8, 1.7, and 1.64 for the same time periods, and also the ofªcial ªgures re-
ported by the Chinese government (on which the UN’s ªgures are based). Thus both
Zhao and Chen (2011) and Zhao (2011) conclude that China’s fertility rate is consid-
erably lower than the ofªcially reported level, and has been lower since the mid
1990s.4 Figure 4 illustrates the divergence between the TFR reported by the United
Nations (2010), the Chinese government, annual survey data and Zhao and Chen’s
own revised rates. Zhao (2011, 54) rightly concludes that “[d]ifferences of nearly
20 percent in estimated fertility levels and of 100 million people in projected popula-
tion size are by no means negligible.”
It is less well known that India also implemented a range of family planning policies
from the 1950s onward. Despite fairly rapid declines in the late 1990s in some south-
ern states, Matthews et al. (2009) show that, overall, India has experienced a slow
but steady decline in fertility rates, with some stagnation in recent years. In their
analysis they consider the potential impact on population growth if India were to
shift away from its focus on sterilization and toward something more akin to
China’s “fewer, later, longer” policy (adopted there in the 1970s) as a way of achiev-
ing more signiªcant fertility decline in the future.5 Their population projections sug-
gest that such a policy could reduce India’s population by 52 million in 2050 com-
pared with the current fertility trajectory.
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3 For further details on China’s population policies, and for estimates of averted births, see
Sharping (2003), Liang and Lee (2006), and the National Family Planning and Population
Commission of China (www.npc.gov.cn/pc/11_4/2011-03/10/content_1640532.htm, ac-
cessed 4 April 2011).
4 Zhang’s (2007) case study provides further evidence of families in rural China shifting from
“active resistance against” to “conscious decision for” the one-child limit.
5 Matthews et al. (2009) provide excellent details of India’s population policies, and
Padmadas et al. (2005) cover both countries. “Later, longer, fewer” refers to later marriage,
longer gaps between children, and fewer births in total.
Of course, in both countries, as elsewhere, the independent impact of fertility poli-
cies is near impossible to separate. The uncertain link between policies and out-
comes is just one of the reasons why fertility projections vary widely. For example,
the United Nations (2010) projections for China’s TFR in 2025–30 range from a “high
fertility” variant of 2.08 down to a “low fertility” variant of 1.08. And the “high fer-
tility” variant of the United Nations (2010) population projections implies that In-
dia’s TFR will fall to 2.65 in 2025–30, whereas according to Dyson’s (2002) “low fer-
tility” variant it will reach 1.59 by that time. Regardless of which of these projections
turns out to be correct, the key point is this: The effects of demographic transitions
are shaped by a range of factors that impact on population structure and labor force
participation, of which fertility rates are just one.
There are numerous channels through which demographic transition, precipitated
by fertility decline, affects economic growth. One of the key predictions of the stan-
dard Solow-Swan model of growth, which assumes diminishing factor returns and
constant labor participation rates across an ageless population, is that slower popu-
lation growth reduces GDP growth, but increases per capita income growth.6 In real-
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6 See Solow (1956) and Swan (1956), and the detailed analytical review offered by Pitchford
(1974, chap. 4).
Figure 4. Alternative estimates of China’s total fertility rates
Source: Zhao and Chen (2011).
ity, as seen here, in a developing country with large numbers of dependent children,
a fall in fertility not only slows population growth, it also reduces the total depend-
ency ratio and raises the proportion of the working-aged population. This effec-
tively boosts the basic Solow-Swan impact on income per capita, giving rise to the
demographic dividend.7
In addition to these supply-side effects, changes in age distributions also have
demand-side implications, including changes in the scale and product composition
of ªnal consumption and saving rates. Additional complexities include the link be-
tween labor force growth, capital returns, and foreign investment, and the interde-
pendence of fertility, longevity, labor force participation, and savings rates, which
are in turn connected to policies affecting health, welfare, and pension systems.8
We take into account many, although not all, of these complexities in the model
presented here.
3.Modeling dependencies, dividends, and economic growth
The approach adopted follows Tyers and Shi (2007), in that a complete demographic
sub-model is integrated within a dynamic numerical model of the global economy.
The baseline scenario represents a “business as usual” projection of global demo-
graphic change and economic growth through to 2030. Our focus in subsequent sec-
tions is on the extent of departures associated with alternative assumptions about
demographic change in China and India. Nonetheless, we ªrst describe the baseline
to make clear the common set of assumptions about future trends in key exogenous
variables and to make the construction of departures from it discernible. A more de-
tailed description of the model can be found in Tyers and Golley (2010).
3.1 Demographic change
Each region represented in the model includes four age groups, two sexes, and two
skill categories, for a total of 16 population groups in each of 18 regions, two of
which are mainland China and India. The four age groups are the dependent young,
adults of fertile and working age, older working adults, and the mostly retired
over 60s. The skill subdivision is between households that provide unskilled labor
and skilled labor, with the former being transformed into the latter through time in
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7 This can easily be seen by the simple decomposition of per capita income (Y/N) into per
worker income (Y/W) times the working-age proportion of the total population (W/N),
where Y is total income, N is total population, and W is the working-age population. See
Bloom and Canning (2005a) for a clear exposition.
8 See, for example, Bloom and Canning (2005b), Heller (2006), and Bloom et al. (2007), and a
more detailed discussion of their ªndings in Golley and Tyers (2011).
response to changes in skilled wage premia, skilled shares of labor forces, and real
per capita income.
Each age-sex-skill group is a homogeneous subpopulation with group-speciªc birth
and death rates and rates of both immigration and emigration. If the group spans
T years, the survival rate to the next age group is the fraction 1/T of its population,
after group-speciªc deaths have been removed and its population has been adjusted
for net migration. The ªnal age group (60) has duration equal to measured life ex-
pectancy at 60, which varies across sexes and regions. Birth rates, life expectancy at
60, and age-speciªc death rates all trend through time asymptotically, approaching a
target at a rate of growth determined by historical observation. Birth rates are here
deªned as the number of births per year per thousand women of fertile age. They
are modiªed to allow for the modeling simpliªcation that the fertile age group
spans ages 15–39 years. Implied TFR are then calculated as the average number of
children born by a woman throughout her life. China’s baseline TFR remains fairly
steady, beginning at 1.9 in 1997 and reaching 1.8 by 2030, midway between the
United Nations (2010) medium and high fertility projections.9 For India, the base
year TFR of 3.5 trends asymptotically to a target of 2.5, slightly lower than the
United Nations (2010) high fertility projection for India.
3.2 Deªning dependency
The deªnition of a population’s total dependency ratio and its components is essen-
tial to projections of its demographic dividend. We consider the number of full-time-
equivalent (FTE) workers, rather than the working-aged population, to be the most
appropriate measure of the labor force on which these ratios are based. The total de-
pendency ratio is then the ratio of the number of people not participating in labor
markets to the number of FTE workers.
To evaluate the number of FTE workers, we ªrst construct labor-force participation
rates by age group, sex, and region from International Labor Organization statistics
on the economically active population. We then investigate the proportion of work-
ers that are part time and the hours they work relative to each regional standard for
full-time work. The result is the number of FTE workers. Labor-force participation
rates for each age–sex group and region are assumed to asymptotically approach the
rate of a target country considered “advanced” in terms of trends in labor-force par-
ticipation. Where female participation rates are rising, Norway provides a com-
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9 We are convinced by the analysis of Zhao (2011) and Zhao and Chen (2011) that even the
United Nations (2010) medium fertility variant is too high. We nevertheless choose this
ªgure as our baseline to facilitate a meaningful comparison with lower fertility, a scenario
we examine subsequently for both China and India.
monly chosen target because its female labor force participation rates are higher
than for other countries.
For China and India, the trends in the baseline labor force participation rates are
summarized in Table 1. China’s aged labor-force participation is assumed to rise
slightly to allow for the expected shortfall in pension income as more retirees leave
private sector employment. India has substantially higher aged participation rates,
lacking China’s central planning history. The other striking pattern is that India’s fe-
male labor force participation rates are considerably lower in the main working age
group (ages 15–59 years) than those in China.10
We identify three components of the total dependency ratio based on the age–sex
groups in the model. The ªrst is the youth dependency ratio, deªned as the number of
dependent children per FTE worker. The second is the aged dependency ratio, in
which the numerator comprises only the non-working population over 60. This can
be different from the more conventional aged dependency ratio depending on aged
labor force participation. The third is the working-aged dependency ratio, in which the
numerator comprises the non-working population of working age (15–59 years). It
is important to note that this ratio is excluded from the standard deªnition of the
“dependency ratio” altogether. The sum of these three dependency ratios indicates
the number of non-working people of all ages and sexes per full-time-equivalent
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10 We acknowledge the comments by Sisira Jayasuriya that India’s female labor force partici-
pation rates are in fact much higher than the ofªcial ªgures, given the large numbers of
women engaged in non-paid work in rural areas. Unfortunately we do not have access to
data that can allow a more accurate representation along these lines and remain consistent
with the measurements used by other countries.
Table 1. Age–sex-speciªc participation rates in China and India, base year (1997) and
projected (2030)
Full-time-equivalent
workers per person
China India
Males Females Males Females
15–39
Initial (1997) 0.79 0.60 0.81 0.35
2030 0.77 0.61 0.83 0.36
40–59
Initial (1997) 0.91 0.43 0.95 0.38
2030 0.93 0.45 0.96 0.40
60
Initial (1997) 0.24 0.04 0.55 0.14
2030 0.27 0.08 0.55 0.15
Source: Values to 1997 are from United Nations (2000). For splits by skill level see Tyers and Bain (2006).
Note: Projections of these parameters to 2030 assume convergence on target rates observed in comparatively “advanced” countries.
Only the end-point values are shown here but the model uses values that change with time along the path to convergence. Note also that
these are averages over the skilled and unskilled categories. In the case of China participation by skilled (educated) women is much
higher than for unskilled, particularly for ages 40+, contributing an extra percent to the 2030 average.
worker, and gives our total dependency ratio. We then deªne the dividend ratio as
the inverse of this.11
Baseline projections of these total dependency ratios and their components for
China and India are shown in Table 2. Notably, one of the largest dependent groups
comprises those of working age who are not participating in the labor market. This
is due, in part, to education participation by those over 15, in part to disablement,
and in part to home-making partners. The simulated changes to 2030 show the ex-
pected declines in youth dependency as fertility declines, with a more dramatic
drop for India. The associated aging boosts aged dependency, with the non-working
aged dependency ratio close to doubling in both countries, albeit from a lower base
in India. Declines in youth dependency more than offset rises in aged dependency
in both regions but the difference is larger for India. Inverting the total dependency
ratios yields dividend ratios that are higher for China (more workers per depend-
ent) but rising much faster for India. The declines in non-working working-age de-
pendency are due primarily to aging of the female labor force.
This raises one of the key points of this paper. According to the commonly used
measures of dependency (based on United Nations projections of age structures),
China’s total dependency ratio is predicted to increase beyond 2010, as shown in
Figure 3, giving rise to claims that China will enter a period of “demographic taxa-
tion” soon thereafter. Even with the ADB’s more reªned “economic support ratio,”
this taxation kicks in around 2020. And yet, when the true number of “dependents”
is taken into account, as in Table 2, we see that in fact China’s dependency ratio is
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11 See Golley and Tyers (2011) for the equations used to calculate these ratios.
Table 2. Dependency and dividend ratios, initial and baseline projection to 2030 (%)
China India
Youth / working Initial 0.59 0.93
2030 0.39 0.62
Non-working-aged / working Initial 0.18 0.12
2030 0.38 0.24
Non-working of working age / working Initial 0.45 0.63
2030 0.40 0.54
Total dependency ratio: non-working / working Initial 1.22 1.68
2030 1.15 1.29
Dividend ratio: inverse of total dependency Initial 0.82 0.60
2030 0.87 0.78
Source: The base period ratios are constructed from population statistics from United Nations (2005) and those for 2030 from simula-
tion results described in the text.
Note: The dependency ratios may be read as the number of dependents per full-time-equivalent worker, and the dividend ratios give the
number of full-time-equivalent workers per dependent.
actually lower (and its dividend ratio higher) in 2030 than it was in 2000. Rising
aged dependency is thus projected to take considerable time to overtake the effects
of declining youth dependency and this process is projected to be incomplete
by 2030.
3.3 Economic growth
The model of the global economy that embodies the demographic behavior dis-
cussed previously considers each region to contribute seven industries: agriculture,
light manufacturing, heavy manufacturing, metals, energy, minerals, and services.
To reºect compositional differences between regions, these products are differenti-
ated by region of origin, meaning that the “light manufactures” produced in one re-
gion are not the same as those produced in others. Consumers substitute imper-
fectly between manufactures from different regions.
To capture the full effects of demographic change, the multiple age, sex, and skill
groups are modeled as separate households. These 16 groups differ in their shares of
regional disposable income, consumption preferences, savings rates, and their labor
supply behavior. While the consumption-savings choice differs for each age–sex
group, it is dependent for all on current group-speciªc real per capita disposable in-
come and the real lending rate. Governments balance their budgets and private
groups save or borrow.
As in other dynamic models of the global economy, the main endogenous driver of
simulated economic growth is physical capital accumulation. The transformation of
workers from unskilled to skilled is another driving force in this model. What dis-
tinguishes the model from its simpler progenitors is the endogeneity of saving rates
and its multiregional structure. All regional capital accounts are open and investors
have adaptive expectations about real regional net rates of return on installed capi-
tal. These drive the distribution of investment across regions. In each, the level of in-
vestment is determined by a comparison of net rates of return on domestic installed
capital with borrowing rates yielded by a global trust, to which each region’s saving
contributes, adjusted by calibrated region-speciªc interest premia.
In addition to the endogenous drivers of growth, there are several sets of exogenous
shocks that the baseline and all other simulations have in common: 1) exogenous
technical change, which is speciªc to primary factors and industries, 2) time-varying
risk premia ensure that all new investment is not directed merely to the most popu-
lous regions which would otherwise have the highest marginal products of capital,
and 3) idiosyncratic shocks to risk premia and investment productivity are intro-
duced to represent the global ªnancial crisis (Tyers and Bain 2008).
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Consumption–savings preferences are represented by age-sex-skill-speciªc con-
sumption equations that relate real per capita consumption to real per capita income
and the real lending rate in each region. There is no endogeneity of saving rates to
life expectancy at 60 even though death rates decline through time and life expec-
tancy increases in both nations. Group saving rates change in response to changes in
income and interest rates but, more importantly, regional average saving rates re-
spond to changes in age and skill distributions. As a young population ages, the
proportion of its population in the saving age groups rises and so does its average
saving rate. In the case of an old population, further aging raises the proportion of
non-working aged, and so its average saving rate falls. The Chinese 60 age group
is unusual, at least through the 1990s, in that it has low labor force participation but
high state-ªnanced retirement incomes. The pensions, combined with low consump-
tion expenditures due to extended family sharing, lead to high initial retiree saving
rates. Yet because the proportion of the aged retiring on relatively generous state
pensions is declining, the 60 groups are assumed to have underlying savings rates
that fall through time. In the case of India, we have no a priori reason to think that
the underlying saving rates will rise or fall, and so these are held constant.
3.4 Baseline projections for China and India
The baseline population and labor force projections for both China and India are il-
lustrated in Figure 5 and the associated changes in the age and sex structure of each
are summarized in Table 3. A dramatic contrast between the projections for China
and India is clear from Figure 5. Whereas China’s labor force falls short of a 13 per-
cent increase over the three decades, and declines after 2025, the Indian labor force
grows strongly, with expansion continuing beyond 2030. This contrast is primarily
due to the relative youth of India’s population and its higher initial fertility rate.
Even though the two populations are projected to reach rough parity in 2030, the
Indian labor force remains smaller, due mainly to lower female participation rates.
Accordingly, the projected Indian labor force has proportionally more male workers.
Interestingly, the more rapid aging of China’s population notwithstanding, the pro-
jected labor forces of the two nations maintain similar proportions of older workers.
This is explained by India’s comparatively high participation rates of 60workers,
which are close to double China’s for both men and women.
4.Alternative demographic scenarios
4.1 Lower fertility
To reºect the recent ªndings of Zhao (2011) and Zhao and Chen (2011), we ªrst ex-
amine the implications of lower fertility in China. In particular, we assume that
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Figure 5. Projected populations and labor forces, China and India (cumulative percent
departures from baseline)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: These are cumulative percent departures from the base year 1997, drawn from the baseline simulation in which India commences
with a much younger population.
China’s average TFR falls over the three decades from the same 1997 level of 1.9
down to 1.1, consistent with the United Nations (2010) low fertility variant.12 The
implications for population and labor force growth are displayed graphically in
Figure 5. Critically, the path of China’s labor force shifts down by substantially less
than that of its population. By 2030, the labor force is smaller by six percent and the
population by ten percent. This is because lower fertility ªrst reduces the youth
population, which does not impact on the labor force but does reduce dependency.
China’s population continues to age, however, and more rapidly with the lower fer-
tility rate. Although this results in an increasing non-working-aged dependency, this
is dominated by the fall in youth dependency, ensuring that total dependency falls
through to 2030, as shown in Figure 6.
The economic effects reºect many of the points made in Section 3. In particular,
supply-side labor-force effects are dominant. The anticipated supply-side story is
that the number of workers contracts, reducing capital productivity, and therefore
reducing the return on Chinese investment. This draws more of the world’s savings
out of China so that its capital stock grows more slowly. China’s GDP might there-
fore be expected to fall substantially because of lower fertility, through its direct and
indirect inºuence over the supply of the two main factors of production, labor and
capital.13 In per capita terms, however, three forces conspire to ensure that the aver-
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12 The model allows for different TFRs in the skilled and production worker populations. The
numbers presented here, and for the subsequent Indian scenario as well, are the weighted
averages of these two sub-populations, with the shocks to the target levels of fertility in each
being proportionally the same.
13 This result could have a number of economic implications that are not captured in our
model, including that higher fertility might reduce pressure on ªscal policy and so the
growth-retarding effects of tax distortions might be reduced. Our scenarios maintain con-
stant tax rates and ªscal deªcits.
Table 3. Baseline population and labor force structure in China and India
China India
Population Millions % female % 60 Millions % female % 60
Initial (1997) 1,272 48.5 9.7 955 48.2 6.9
2010 1,364 48.7 14.8 1,146 48.4 10.6
2020 1,375 48.8 18.4 1,263 48.5 13.0
2030 1,353 49.0 21.2 1,349 48.5 14.8
Labor force % 40 % 40
Initial (1997) 570 37.2 33.9 356 27.4 36.3
2010 618 36.7 41.2 459 27.1 41.7
2020 624 36.4 45.4 522 27.2 45.1
2030 613 36.1 48.2 568 27.5 47.9
Source: Projection using the baseline simulation of the model described in the text. The labor forces are measured in full-time-equiva-
lent workers.
age Chinese person beneªts. First, the Solow-Swan predisposition (due to diminish-
ing marginal returns) toward higher real wage growth in response to the reduction
in labor supply increases the growth of income per capita. Second, the associated
shift in the age distribution causes a fall in dependency and hence a further increase
in per capita income growth. Finally, because much of the capital outºow stems
from foreign investment, there would be a reduction in the need to reward foreign
owners. In the end, China’s 2030 real per capita income is higher by 7.4 percent, as
shown in Figure 7.
We then conduct a lower fertility scenario for India, which embodies a fall in the av-
erage TFR to 1.6 by 2030, compared with 2.5 in the baseline simulation and similar
to Dyson’s (2002) “low fertility” variant. This reºects the potential for (even if not
the realization of) family planning polices to bring India’s fertility rates down more
rapidly in the next two decades. As shown in Figure 5, this yields substantial slow-
downs in both the population and the labor force. As in the fertility shock to China,
the effect on the population is proportionally larger than that on the population.
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Figure 6. Total dependency ratios (non-working over working)
Source: Model simulations described in the text.
Note: These are the simulated ratios of the total non-working-working population and the full-time-equivalent labor force. The declines in
dependency in both cases represent primarily declines in youth dependency.
Again, this is because fertility changes ªrst affect the youth population, and not
those of working age. In contrast with China, however, in India the difference is
even larger because of its relatively young population, its large population of
women of fertile age, and its high, aged labor-force participation rates. As shown in
Figure 6, the diminished slowing impact on the labor force results in a substantial
decline in the total dependency ratio, which is the combination of a minimal rise in
non-working-aged dependency combined with a dramatic decline in youth depend-
ency. Critically, by 2030, although there is a decline in Indian GDP relative to the
baseline, the corresponding gain in real per capita income is 11.4 percent, as shown
in Figure 7.
4.2 Higher aged labor force participation
These two simulations illustrate the often-neglected point that the economic effects
of demographic change depend on a range of variables, total fertility being only the
most obvious.14 The dominance of the labor-supply (relative to the saving and con-
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14 Death rates are also obvious determinants, though these have had more stable declining
Figure 7. Effects of demographic change on real per capita income
Source: Simulations of the model described in the text.
Note: These are percent departures from the baseline simulation.
sumption mix) effects of demographic change on the economy15 suggests that labor-
force participation rates are also critical. We demonstrate this here by considering
the impact of delayed retirement and hence higher participation rates by China’s
and then by India’s aged (60) population. As seen in Table 1, the baseline partici-
pation rates for China’s aged population in 1997 and 2030 are low; with rates that
are projected to be little more than half of India’s in 2030 for both men and women
and that are low by other East Asian standards (Golley and Tyers 2006).
There are, however, numerous reasons why China’s labor-force participation rates
could be higher in the future. Perhaps the most obvious of these is increased aged
participation and hence a rise in the average retirement age. In an inºuential World
Bank (1997) report on China’s social security system, it is noted that current retire-
ment ages of 60 for men and 55 for women were set at a time when life expectancy
was only 50 years, compared with 71 years now. The report called for a gradual in-
crease in the retirement age to 65 years and even higher as longevity continues to in-
crease. But mandated retirement ages only affect workers in government and large
regulated private institutions. Much of China’s growth in recent decades has been
associated with the formation of private and family businesses and, in this private
world, the incentive to continue working beyond 60 is stronger (see Golley and
Tyers 2006).
To reºect this possibility, we next consider a simulation in which China’s average
aged participation rates rise through 2030, from about 30 percent to 43 percent for
men and from 5 percent to 25 percent for women.16 This simulation continues to as-
sume that lower fertility rates also prevail, consistent with the “low fertility” scenar-
ios discussed previously. Although changes in participation rates have no direct im-
pacts on total populations, they clearly affect the growth of the labor force, as shown
in Figure 5. Even when combined with low fertility, higher aged participation can
raise China’s overall labor force above its baseline level through to 2025. It dives be-
low the baseline level thereafter only because the 60 participation rate converges
on a target level from below and, as this occurs, the effects of lower fertility are
again dominant.
Increases in real GDP and real per capita income are obvious consequences of higher
aged participation in the workforce, though these aggregate advantages are at least
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trends in China and India, and as they are assumed to continue in all simulations they are
not discussed further here.
15 See Tyers and Shi (2007) for evidence of this.
16 Recall that these are weighted averages of simulated participation rates that differ for pro-
fessional (skilled) workers and production (unskilled) workers.
partially offset by the loss of leisure time and lower real wages. Nonetheless, these
downsides of increased participation are in part counterbalanced, particularly in
the expanding services sector, by the beneªts of continued social engagement
and learning.17
Our ªnal simulation focuses on raising India’s aged participation rate. For India,
however, ofªcial statistics suggest aged participation is already high, particularly
among males, and so the changes are more marginal and directed to female partici-
pation. Whereas our baseline had male participation rising from 55 percent to
60 percent by 2030 and from 14 percent to 22 percent for women, here we consider a
scenario in which female participation rises to 30 percent by 2030. As expected, this
more modest change yields far smaller effects than the larger shocks to participation
imposed in the Chinese case, as shown in Figures 5–7. The additional impact on In-
dia’s labor force is only slightly above the trajectory for low fertility alone (Figure 5),
and the consequent reduction in total dependency is minimal, particularly com-
pared with China (Figure 6). This contributes to an increase in India’s real per capita
income of 11.7 percent by 2030, compared with 11.4 percent for fertility reduction
alone, whereas China’s real per capita income increases by nearly 11 percent, com-
pared with just 7.5 percent for the low fertility scenario.
4.3 China’s and India’s demographic dividends, 1997–2030
As discussed earlier, the economic effects of the modeled demographic changes
combine three stories. First, the Solow-Swan effect of population slowdown (and
hence higher marginal products due to diminishing factor returns) leads to real
growth in per capita terms. Second, the shift in age distribution away from depend-
ent children toward the working ages also causes real growth in per capita terms (as
each worker has fewer dependents to spread his/her income across). Third, in-
creased labor force participation also raises output in per capita terms. Moreover,
increased participation also enhances the second effect, age distribution, by enlarg-
ing the rise in the labor force due to the movement of the dependent young into
working age.
To isolate the pure effects of changes in age distributions—that is, the demographic
dividends—a variant of the model is constructed in which the endogenous demo-
graphic behavior is switched off and the populations in each age group are con-
strained to follow exogenous and identical time paths. This ensures that age distri-
butions are held ªxed through time. The resulting simulations therefore pick up the
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17 These tradeoffs will clearly differ from person to person based on their preferences for labor,
leisure, social engagement, and learning.
Solow-Swan effects of (now exogenous) slowdowns in population growth, com-
bined with any growth in labor force participation, which serve to raise real per ca-
pita income, but they exclude the effects of changes in age distributions.
For each of our three scenarios (baseline, low fertility, and low fertility with in-
creased aged participation) we take the post-1997 annual population changes from
the simulation with full demography and then, in the comparator, we switch off the
demography and all age groups are made to follow these now exogenous time
paths. We then consider the original simulation, with its full demography, as a de-
parture from the “ªxed-age distribution” comparator. For each of the three scenarios
we make one such comparator simulation for China and, separately, one for India,
in each case extracting the effect of age distribution change by subtracting the com-
parator results for real per capita income from those drawn from the simulation
with full demography. The result is a measure, for each scenario, of the post-1997
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Figure 8. Demographic dividends: Age distribution components of demographic effects on
real per capita income
Source: Simulations of the model described in the text.
Note: These are contributions to real per capita income growth, measured here as cumulative percent departures from the base year 1997.
They are calculated by comparing full simulations under each of the three scenarios with corresponding simulations in which the total pop-
ulation follows the same time path but there is no change in the age distribution.
demographic dividend—the contribution to the enlargement of real per capita in-
come since 1997 that is solely due to the changing age distribution. The resulting
dividends are illustrated in Figure 8.
In the baseline case, the aging that occurs through 2030 raises the proportion of the
population engaged in work and so raises real per capita income. India starts the
new millennium with considerably more youth dependency than China and so ag-
ing moves this youthful abundance into working age and therefore reduces overall
dependency. The result is a gain of 6.7 percent in real per capita income over the
three decades. China, too, has mostly youth dependency but, by 2000, there is much
less than in India and so aging is less beneªcial, delivering a post-1997 demographic
dividend that stabilizes at 1.6 percent in real per capita income through to 2030.
For China, then, the principal economic effect of its population slowdown is Swan-
Solow, with a smaller labor force yielding higher per capita income. Still, the fact
that China continues to receive a positive demographic dividend through to 2030,
albeit a small one, contrasts with recent claims that the end of its demographic tran-
sition, and hence its demographic dividend, is imminent. This point is further em-
phasized by the demographic dividends under China’s lower fertility and higher
aged participation rate scenarios, which increase to 4.1 and 5.9 percent of real per
capita income, respectively.
The comparison that gives rise to these estimates enables the decomposition of the
rise in China’s real per capita income due to fertility decline and increased aged par-
ticipation after 1997, as shown in Table 4. The contribution of the Swan-Solow effect
is the largest, accounting for 44 percent of the total increase in real per capita in-
come, and that of the demographic dividend comes in second, accounting for
22 percent of the income rise. Thus, although the demographic dividend is not the
major contributor to economic gains from slower population growth, it is still a sub-
stantial contributor. Combined with the indirect effect via increased participation,
the contribution of the change in age distribution almost equals that of the Swan-
Solow effect.
For India, Figure 8 illustrates the potential for a signiªcant demographic dividend in
the future should fertility continue to decline. Compared with a baseline demo-
graphic dividend of just over 6 percent of real per capita income, lower fertility is
projected to deliver a real per capita income gain of 11.7 percent by 2030. Higher
aged participation in India has a modest additional effect because it is assumed only
to alter participation by aged women and by a comparatively small margin. As indi-
cated in Table 4, the Swan-Solow effect is the dominant demographic force in India
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as it is in China, contributing 62 percent of the increase in real per capita income.
Nonetheless, the remainder is dominated by the demographic dividend, which de-
livers another 35 percent.
5.Conclusions
Population structure plays a critical role in determining the relative magnitudes of
labor force growth and total population growth and the consequent change in de-
pendency ratios, which in turn impact signiªcantly on per capita income growth. In
particular, the decline in fertility rates since the 1950s has reduced total population
growth and dependencies in both China and India, precipitating higher per capita
income growth, or demographic dividends, in both cases. Given their different pop-
ulation age structures, it comes as no surprise that the timing and magnitude of
China’s and India’s demographic dividends have also differed: China’s largely lies
in the past whereas India’s lies in the present.
Using accurate measures of the working population (rather than the working-aged
population) to calculate dependency, however, reveals that China’s demographic
dividend (due to age distribution changes since 2000) is in fact projected to remain
positive through to 2030, contrary to the claims of others. More critically, this “true”
dependency ratio reºects the actual beneªts from having a rising share of workers
in the population, rather than the potential beneªts of having a rising share of the
merely working aged. Our ªndings do not refute the empirical stream of work that
highlights the signiªcance of the demographic dividend as a key determinant of
economic growth. Rather they reinforce it, because age distribution effects are larger,
particularly in China’s case, when trends in participation rates are properly ac-
counted for.
In both China and India, it is quite plausible that fertility decline will happen more
rapidly in the decades ahead, with recent evidence suggesting that China’s fertility
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Table 4. Decomposition of 1997–2030 demographic effects on real per capita income
China India
Swan-Solow effect 4.9 7.3
Age distribution (demographic dividend): direct 2.5 4.1
Age distribution interaction with aged participation: indirect 1.8 0.2
Aged participation 1.8 0.1
Total 11.0 11.7
Source: Projections using the model described in the text.
Note: This requires a comparison of the standard baseline, and low-fertility and low-fertility high-aged participation scenarios with
their corresponding comparator versions that lack age distribution change.
rate has already fallen much further than ofªcial (and therefore United Nations) re-
ports indicate, and with India actively trying to promote more rapid fertility decline.
Our simulations show that lower fertility reduces GDP and increases real per capita
income in both countries, although India gains substantially more per capita income
than China per unit change in fertility, a result that depends critically on India’s
higher youth dependency. Similarly, simulations that raise aged labor force partici-
pation rates in both countries are shown to increase per capita income, with China
not surprisingly standing to gain more, given its relatively aged and more rapidly
aging population, and its comparatively low rates of aged labor force participation.
These alternative simulations indicate clearly that the magnitude of both China’s
and India’s future demographic dividends depend on a range of factors, of which
policies that impact on fertility rates and labor force participation are just two.
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